Defamation Injunctions and Platform Takedowns in Queensland

Key Takeaways

• Interlocutory injunctions to restrain publication of defamatory matter are rare. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, the Court held that they must apply exceptional caution, and the injunction will ordinarily be refused if the defendant raises any plausible defence.
• The publication must be clearly, not merely arguably, defamatory. A plaintiff who can show only an arguable case will not obtain an interlocutory injunction in defamation proceedings.
• Section 39A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), introduced by the Defamation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025, gives Courts power to order non-party digital intermediaries to remove or block defamatory content after judgment or an injunction has been obtained against the publisher.
• The threshold for a section 39A order requires a prior judgment, temporary injunction, or final injunction against the publisher. It does not apply as a freestanding remedy before proceedings against the publisher are resolved.
• A digital intermediary must be given procedural fairness before a section 39A order is made against it, but urgent temporary orders can be sought where continued publication is causing ongoing harm.
• The new section 31A defence for digital intermediaries that act on complaints within seven days creates an incentive for platforms to remove content promptly. Sending a formal written complaint to the platform before and during proceedings preserves rights and may achieve removal without the need for a court order.

Introduction

Most defamation disputes are about repairing damage that has already been done. But there are two situations where a person facing a defamatory publication needs something different: either the publication has not yet gone out and they want to stop it, or it is already online and they need it removed. In both cases, the remedy sought is not damages. It is an order from the Court directing what can or cannot be published.

Those remedies exist in Queensland, but they are not easily obtained, and the process for getting them changed significantly when the Defamation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 commenced on 26 December 2025.

This article explains the two distinct mechanisms: the interlocutory injunction to restrain publication before or during proceedings and the non-party access prevention order under section 39A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) to compel a digital platform to remove or block content after a judgment or injunction has been obtained against the publisher.

Part 1: The Interlocutory Injunction to Restrain Publication

An interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory matter is one of the most difficult orders to obtain in Australian civil litigation. Courts have consistently approached these applications with exceptional caution, and the leading authority confirms that the test applied in defamation is more demanding than the general interlocutory injunction test applied in other civil proceedings.

Why courts are so reluctant to grant them

The reluctance arises from the fundamental tension between defamation and the public interest in free communication. Granting an injunction before publication is a form of prior restraint, and Courts have long recognised that restraining expression before it occurs is a more serious interference with free speech than compensating for it after the fact.

The implied freedom of political communication recognised by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 reinforces that reluctance in cases touching on matters of public interest.

The practical consequence is that interlocutory injunctions to restrain defamatory publication are rare. They are generally confined to cases where the defamatory character of the matter is obvious, no plausible defence can be identified, and the harm the plaintiff will suffer from publication cannot be adequately compensated by a later award of damages.

The test from Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill

The leading authority on interlocutory injunctions in defamation proceedings is Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, in which the High Court by a 4:2 majority discharged an injunction that had been granted to restrain the ABC from broadcasting a documentary about the respondent, a convicted murderer, that made allegations connecting him to additional murders.

The majority held that the general principles governing interlocutory injunctions apply to defamation proceedings, but with enhanced caution that reflects the public interest in free communication. The court must consider three things:

1. Whether there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. In defamation cases, this requires the plaintiff to show more than an arguable case. The publication must be clearly, not merely arguably, defamatory.
2. Whether the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages would not be an adequate remedy. In defamation, this is a significant hurdle: Courts have traditionally regarded an award of damages as an adequate remedy for reputational harm and will only depart from that view where the harm from publication is of a character that money cannot repair.
3. Whether the balance of convenience clearly favours granting the injunction, with proper account taken of the public interest in free communication of opinion and information.

If the defendant raises any plausible defence, including truth, honest opinion, qualified privilege, or the new digital intermediary defence under section 31A, the injunction will ordinarily be refused. The existence of a credible defence is generally fatal to the application.

An interlocutory injunction in defamation will be refused if the defendant raises any defence that is not plainly unsustainable. Exceptional caution applies. The cases where injunctions are granted are rare and generally confined to situations of obvious falsity and no credible defence.

When an injunction will be granted

Despite the high threshold, courts have granted interlocutory injunctions in defamation proceedings in a small category of cases.

In School for Excellence Pty Ltd v Trendy Rhino Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 514, Justice Dixon observed that interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases may be granted in exceptional circumstances, including where the defendant displays vendetta-like behaviour, shows a disinclination to conform to anticipated findings of the Court, or where the defamatory character of the material is so obvious that no reasonable person could regard it as otherwise.

That formulation has been applied in Queensland proceedings. In Bruder Expedition Pty Ltd v Leigh[2019] QDC 116, the Queensland District Court granted an injunction in an injurious falsehood matter applying the O’Neill principles where the defendant’s conduct went beyond a legitimate dispute to a sustained campaign against the plaintiff’s business.

The practical indicators that favour an injunction application are:

• The publication makes plainly false allegations of serious criminal conduct or dishonesty that cannot be supported by any evidence.
• The defendant has no credible defence and has acknowledged as much, or the defences raised are plainly unsustainable on the facts.
• The defendant has demonstrated a clear intention to continue publishing or to escalate the campaign despite being put on notice.
• The harm from publication is of a character that cannot be adequately compensated by damages, for example where the plaintiff’s professional registration, employment, or ongoing business relationships will be immediately and irreparably destroyed by the publication.
• The publication is targeted at a specific and imminent event, such as a business transaction, an election, or a professional appointment, where the damage from even temporary publication cannot be undone by a later damages award.

Interim injunctions: the first 48 hours

Where publication is imminent and there is no time to serve the defendant and bring the matter on for a full interlocutory hearing, a plaintiff may apply ex parte (without notice to the other side) for an interim injunction to restrain publication for a short period, typically 24 to 72 hours, until an interlocutory hearing can be convened.

Ex parte applications in this context are treated with even greater caution than contested interlocutory applications, and courts will require a clear undertaking as to damages; full and frank disclosure of all material facts, including those that might favour the defendant; and cogent evidence of urgency.

Any interim order obtained ex parte will be subject to a return date at which the defendant can be heard. The plaintiff should be prepared for that hearing on short notice.

Part 2: What Happens If the Defendant Ignores the Injunction

Obtaining an injunction is only half the equation. If the defendant ignores it and continues to publish, the plaintiff’s next step is an application under rule 926 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) for the defendant to be punished for contempt of court.

Under section 129 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), the Queensland District Court has the same power to punish for contempt as the Supreme Court, including the power to impose a fine, community service, or imprisonment.

To establish contempt, the applicant must prove five elements beyond reasonable doubt:

1. that the court made an order;
2. that the terms of that order were clear and capable of being understood;
3. that the defendant had prior knowledge of the order before the breach;
4. that the defendant breached its terms; and
5. that there was no lawful excuse for doing so.

The standard of proof is criminal. Rule 926 requires strict compliance, including personal service of the application on the respondent and specification of the exact conduct alleged to constitute the contempt.

What ‘breach’ means in practice: Bruder Expeditions Pty Ltd v Leigh

In Bruder Expeditions Pty Ltd v Leigh [2019] QDC 271, the Court found Ms Leigh in contempt of a permanent injunction made following a jury verdict in an injurious falsehood trial.

The injunction restrained her from publishing statements to the same effect or substantially the same effect as the four statements the jury had found to be false. Two days after the order was made, Ms Leigh published fresh posts on the same Facebook page making substantially the same allegations about the manufacturer’s product safety and customer conduct.

The contempt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Ms Leigh had acknowledged in her own words that she was restricted from publishing anything in relation to the first to fourth publications, which the court found was compelling evidence of prior knowledge of the order.

The fresh posts fell within the scope of the injunction on a plain reading of their content. The fact that Ms Leigh may have been intoxicated when she posted was no answer: the posts were reasoned, articulate, and deliberate, and the court found she had shown no remorse and no insight into the seriousness of what she had done.

On punishment, the court noted that imprisonment is the sentence of last resort under section 9(2)(a)(i) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)and that a fine was not viable given the respondent’s limited means. Ms Leigh was ordered to perform 200 hours of unpaid community service.

The Queensland Court of Appeal in Leigh v Bruder Expedition Pty Ltd (No 2) (2022) 13 QR 120 granted leave to appeal but later dismissed the appeal, upholding the contempt conviction in full. The Court confirmed the order was sufficiently clear to found the charge and that all procedural requirements had been met. Special leave to the High Court was refused.

An injunction must be complied with until it is set aside by a court. Defying an injunction while appealing the underlying judgment is not a lawful excuse for contempt. The obligation to comply runs from the moment the order is made.

One further point the Bruder litigation illustrates: the Court of Appeal separately set aside the underlying injurious falsehood verdict and the original injunction on the merits in [2020] QCA 246, finding a misdirection on malice at trial. The contempt conviction was nonetheless upheld because it concerned the breach of the order as it stood at the time of the breach. The two questions are entirely separate. A defendant who publishes in defiance of an injunction cannot avoid a contempt finding by later succeeding in having the underlying judgment set aside on appeal.

Part 3: Non-Party Access Prevention Orders Under Section 39A

The second mechanism is fundamentally different in character. It does not restrain the publisher before or during proceedings. It operates after a judgment or injunction has already been obtained against the publisher, and it enables the court to order a digital intermediary, such as a social media platform, a search engine, a website host, or an internet service provider, to take steps to remove or block access to the defamatory content, even if that intermediary is not a party to the proceedings at all.

This power was introduced by the Defamation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025, which inserted section 39A into the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) with effect from 26 December 2025. It directly addresses a practical problem that had long frustrated successful defamation plaintiffs: winning judgment against the publisher is one thing, but compelling a third-party platform to remove the content has historically required a separate proceeding or a voluntary takedown request.

When section 39A applies

Section 39A(1) applies in three circumstances:

1. First, where the plaintiff has obtained judgment for defamation against the defendant.
2. Second, where a court has granted a temporary injunction or made another temporary order preventing the defendant from continuing to publish or republishing the matter pending the determination of the proceedings.
3. Third, where a court has granted a final injunction or made another final order to that effect.

In each of those circumstances, section 39A(2) empowers the Court to order a digital intermediary who is not a party to the proceedings to take access prevention steps, or other steps the court considers necessary, to prevent or limit the continued publication or republication of the matter, or to comply with or give effect to the judgment, injunction, or other order already made.

Section 39A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) allows a court to order a platform, host, or search engine to remove or block defamatory content even if it is not a party to the defamation proceedings. The platform must be given an opportunity to be heard, but urgent temporary orders can be made.

Procedural fairness for the non-party intermediary

Section 39A does not allow orders to be made against a non-party digital intermediary without notice. The Explanatory Notes to the 2025 Bill confirm that the intermediary must be given an opportunity to be heard before an order is made, consistent with the requirements of procedural fairness. However, where urgency is established and harm from continued publication is significant, temporary orders can be sought on short notice with a return date at which the intermediary can appear and be heard.

This is a materially practical consideration. The major digital platforms, including Meta, Google, and X, have legal teams experienced in responding to Court orders and will exercise any available rights to be heard. Applicants should expect the intermediary to appear at the return date and should be prepared to address submissions about the scope and terms of the proposed order.

The relationship with the section 31A defence

The Defamation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 also introduced a new defence for digital intermediaries under section 31A. That defence is available where the intermediary had an accessible complaints mechanism at the time of publication and, if a written complaint was made, took reasonable access prevention steps within seven days of receiving it.

The practical interplay between section 31A and section 39A is significant for plaintiffs. A digital intermediary that has taken reasonable access prevention steps within seven days of a written complaint may have a complete defence to a defamation claim.

That same willingness to act on complaints, however, also makes the intermediary more amenable to complying with a section 39A access prevention order once judgment or an injunction has been obtained against the publisher.

Conversely, a platform that ignored a written complaint and did not take access prevention steps within seven days is exposed to a defamation claim as a publisher in its own right and is unlikely to be able to resist a section 39A order once the substantive proceedings against the original publisher are resolved.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I get an injunction to stop someone publishing something defamatory about me before it goes out?

Possibly, but the threshold is very high. Under Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, the publication must be clearly defamatory, the defendant must have no defence that is not plainly unsustainable, and the balance of convenience must clearly favour granting the order. If the defendant has any credible defence, the injunction will ordinarily be refused. These orders are rare and confined to cases of obvious falsity where damages would not be an adequate remedy.

How quickly do I need to act if I want to stop a publication before it goes out?

Immediately. The window between becoming aware of an intended publication and the publication date can be hours. Courts can hear urgent ex parte applications for interim injunctions on the same day in appropriate circumstances, but the application requires evidence of the publication, its defamatory character, and the urgency. Do not wait to see if the publication actually goes ahead before seeking advice.

What is a section 39A order and how is it different from an injunction?

An injunction is directed at the publisher and restrains them from publishing or continuing to publish the defamatory matter. A section 39A order is directed at a non-party digital intermediary, such as a platform, host, or search engine, and compels it to remove or block access to the content. Section 39A was introduced by the Defamation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 and only applies after a judgment or injunction against the publisher has already been obtained. It cannot be used as a freestanding remedy before those proceedings are resolved.

The defamatory content is still online after I won judgment. What can I do?

Apply for a section 39A access prevention order against the digital intermediary hosting or distributing the content. The judgment against the publisher satisfies the threshold condition in section 39A(1)(a). The intermediary must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard, but the existence of a judgment substantially strengthens the application and the platform has no basis to contest the defamation finding itself.

Can I force a platform to take down defamatory content without going to court?

Not by compulsion. However, sending a formal written complaint to the platform is a practical step that should happen early. Under section 31A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), a digital intermediary that receives a written complaint must take reasonable access prevention steps within seven days to maintain its defence against a defamation claim. If the platform acts voluntarily within that window, the content is removed without the need for a court order. If it does not, it loses the section 31A defence and becomes more exposed in any subsequent section 39A application.

Does it matter that the publisher has no money if the content is the real problem?

Yes, and it is worth thinking about from the outset. A section 39A order against a solvent platform may be far more valuable than a damages judgment against an insolvent publisher. If the primary objective is content removal rather than financial compensation, the litigation strategy should be structured to obtain the judgment or injunction against the publisher that triggers section 39A as efficiently as possible, with content removal as the endgame rather than damages.

Will the platform fight a section 39A order?

Major platforms have legal teams and will generally exercise their right to be heard before a section 39A order is made. They are not required to simply comply on receipt of the application. However, their ability to resist the order is limited once a defamation judgment or injunction against the publisher has been obtained. They cannot relitigate the defamation findings. Their submissions are more likely to focus on the scope and terms of the proposed access prevention steps than on whether any order should be made at all.